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BECKLEY V. RECLAMATION BOARD [48 C.2d 
No. 6768. In Bank. June 1957.] 
CLARA L. as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, 
IiECLAMA'l'ION BOARD etc., et Respondents. 
C. J;'. SBA VER et Appellants, v. RECLAMA'flON 
D. 
BO.r\RD et al., Respondents. 
GEORGE et 
BOARD 
Appellants, v. RECLAMA'l'ION 
et al., Respondents. 
KA'l'HAUlNE ]'HANCES ERISEY, Appellant, v. RECLA-
:MATIO~ BOARD et al., Respondents. 
Continuance-Absence of Counsel-Where Attorney is Legis-
lator.-The purpose underlying Code Civ. Proc., § 1054.1 (for-
a part of § 1054), relating to extensions of time to 
attorney-legislators, namely, that such legislators should be 
Telieved by the law from concerning themselves with extrane-
ous matters or interests not pertaining to their legislative 
duties while they are attending sessions of the Legislature 
and actually prosecuting their duties as such, is equally 
applicable to Code Civ. Proc., § 595, relating to postponement 
of trials of civil actions where attorneys of record are legis-
lators and are prosecuting their duties in that capacity. 
[2a, 2b] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Discretion of Court 
-Denial of Motion and Review.-Where the trial court did 
not receive notice of an attorney-legislator's duties in the 
Leg-islature until after the judgments in consolidated cases 
in which he was an attorney for plaintiffs had been entered, and 
under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 595, 1054.1, if the court had 
been advised that such attorney was a member of the Legisla-
ture he would have been entitled to a continuance until his 
duties were concluded in order to prepare an 
amended complaint, it was an abuse of discretion to deny 
motions to vacate the judgments, entered after general de-
murrers to the complaints were sustained without leave to 
amend, in view of the settled policy that where possible there 
shall be a trial on the merits and the fact that the attorney-
legislator was not to blame for the miscarriage or nondelivery 
of a telegram advising the court of his legislative duties and 
his request for a continuance. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Continuance, § 18 et seq. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 132; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 296. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Continuance, § 13; [2] Judgments, 
§ 162; [3] Pleading,§ 183; [4] Judgments,§ 172. 
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[4] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Grounds for Relief.-Un~ 
der Code Civ. § a trial court may set aside its 
when the judgment was taken 
his 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Colusa 
County motions to set aside rntered 
general demurrers to complaints were sustained \Yithout leave 
to amend. Hugh H. Donovan, Judge. Reversed. 
Earl D. Desmond, Edward Vayne Miller, Clarence C. 
Jack B. Tenney, Edwin J. Regan, Richard J. Dolwig, James 
E. Cunningham, ,Jess R. Dorsey, Nathan F. Coombs, 
M. Brown, Gordon A. Finery, Geralil J. O'Gara, Randal F. 
Dickey, S. C. Masterson and Allen ]Hiller for 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, \Valter S. Rountree, 
Assistant Attorney General, \Villard A. Shank and F. G. 
Girard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-These are appeal!'l in four eonsolidated easelS 
from orders denying motions to srt aside and vacate 
ments entered after general demurrers to the were 
sustained without leave to amend. 
Plaintiffs, appellants here, filed the original complaints for 
damages against defendants, respondents, for the negligent 
construction of the Sacramento River Flood Control Project 
and negligent diversion of stream \Vaters from the natural 
channel of the Sacramento River and onto lands belonging 
to plaintiffs on JJf.ay 1, 1917. On 3, 1952, the :first 
amended complaints were :filed. On December 1, 1952, de-
fendants :filed demurrers and motions to strike portions of 
the :first amended complaints. By stipulation entered into on 
February 24, 1953, certain proposed amendments to the :first 
amended complaints were :filed with the county clerk to be 
submitted to the trial court for its aid in determination of 
the demurrers. 
E. Vayne Miller and Earl D. Desmond were the sole attor-
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, ~ 127 et seq.; Am.Jur., Judg-
ments, § 633 et seq. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Couucil. 
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neys of record for the plaintiffs in the four cases. Earl D. 
Desmond was then and still is a member of the Senate of the 
California Legislature from the 19th Senatorial District com-
prising Sacramento County. 'rhe California Legislature com-
menced the second portion of its regular 1953 session on 
February 24, 1953, and continued in session until Jttne 10, 
1953, when it took its final adjournment. 
On May 11, 1.953, Miller received from the elerk of the 
Superior Court of Colusa County, a notice that the defend-
ants' demurrer to the first amended complaints had been sus-
tained without leave to amend. Subsequent to receiving the 
notice and during the same week, Miller visited Senator Des-
mond at his offices in Sacramento where a discussion was 
had concerning the ruling on the demurrer. It was agreed by 
and between them that a photostatic copy of the second 
amended complaint in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 
App.2d 520 [59 P.2d 605], would be obtained so that amend-
ments could be proposed in the instant actions in accordance 
therewith to aid the trial court prior to entry of judgment 
in the four cases and that a motion would be made for a 
reconsideration of the ruling on the demurrers. 
On May 20, 1953, Senator Desmond sent a vVestern Union 
telegram to ,Judge Hugh H. DonoYan (the trial judge) as 
follows: 
'',Judge Hugh H. Donovan 
Martinez, California 
"Request entry judgment George Beckley Erisey am1 
Seaver against State be not executed by Court until June 
lOth. Legislative duties necessitate continuance so I can study 
proceedings. 
Senator Earl D. Desmond" 
.Judge Donovan stated to counsel in open court on the 
hearing of the motion to vacate that he clid not receive the 
above telegram. 
On J1tne 3, 1953, judgment was entered. 
On J11ne 5, 1953, Senator Desmond sent the following West-
ern Union telegram to Judge Donovan: 
"Judge Hugh Donovan 
Martinez, California 
"Request judgment be not entered Colusa eases until June 
19th. Still attending legislature. 
Senator Earl D. Desmond" 
'!.'he 
Donovan. 
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Senator Desmond sent the following West-
to Donovan : 
returned from IJegislative duties. Am studying 
not be entered until June 26. 
Earl D. Desmond" 
were admittedly received by Judge 
On after learning on August 4, 1953, 
that entered, plaintiffs moved to vacate 
the (•ntered on June :i, 1953. The motion was 
made on grounds: 
'''!.'his motion will be made upon the grounds that the said 
was entered through the mistake and inadvertence, 
or excusable neglect of counsel for the Plaintiffs, and 
upon the that said Judgment was entered contrary 
to the of sections 595, 1054, and 1054.1 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure of California." 
On November 1.953, the trial court rendered a memoran-
dum of decision denying the plaintiffs' motions to vacate the 
judgments. In the memorandum of decision, the trial court 
stated that "Plaintiffs have not met the requirements of said 
seetion. rrhe submission of the photostatic copy of the com-
plaint in tl1e Archer v. Los Angeles ease cannot be considered 
a here and the Court did instruct counsel for 
<ldemlauts to submit a written order to be signed by the 
in aeco rdance with the memorandum of decision." 
On December 3, 1953, counsel for plaintiffs tiled with the 
elerk of Colusa County, a proposed amendment to the 
first anwnded complaints to be C"onsidered on plaintiffs' motion 
to vacate the judgments. 
On December 7', 1.953, counsel for plaintiffs tiled notices of 
motions in the Eonr actions on appeal for an order to set aside 
the memorandnm of cleeision and opinion of the court entered 
December 1, 19;)3, refusing to vacate the judgments, and to 
moye the court for an order permitting the filing of the 
proposed amendment to the first amended complaints. 
On December the trial court denied plaintiffs' 
motion to set aside the decision to vaeate the judgments. 
On 8, 1954, plaintiffs filed notiee of appeal from 
the order deuying their motion to vacate the judgments. 
Plaintiffs' primary contention i;; that under the provisions 
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of section 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure a mandatory 
duty devolved upon the trial court not to and enter the 
judgment here involved. 
Section 595 then read, in part, as follows: ''The trial of 
any civil action, ... or ... proceeding before a state board 
or commission or officer, irrespective of the date of the filing 
thereof or when it became at issue, or the hearing of any 
motion, demurrer, or other proceeding, shall be postponed 
when it appears to the court, board, commission, or officer 
before which such action or proceeding is pending that either 
party thereto, or any attorney of record therein (whether he 
became an attorney of record before or after the commence-
ment of a legislative session or before or after his appointment 
to a legislatiye committee) .... ·when the Legislature is in 
session or in recess such action or proceeding shaH not, 
without the consent of the attorney of record therein, be 
brought on for trial or hearing before the expiration of thirty 
( 30) days next following final adjournment of the IJegisla-
ture or the commencement of a recess of more than thirty-
five ( 35) days.'' 
Section 1054.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in 
part, as follows: "\Vhen an act to be done, as provided by 
law or rule of court, relates to the pleadings in the action, 
or the undertakings to be filed, or the justification of sureties, 
or the preparation of bills of exceptions, or of amendments 
thereto, or to the service of notices other than of appeal and 
of intention to move for a new trial, the time allowed therefor, 
unless otherwise expressly provided, shall be extended by the 
judge of the court in which the action is pending, or by the 
judge who presided at the trial of said action, when it appears 
to the judge of any court to whom such application is made 
that an attorney of record for the party applying for such 
extension is a Member of the Legislature of this State, and 
that the Legislature is in session or in recess not exceeding a 
recess of forty ( 40) days or that a legislative committee of 
which he is a duly appointed member is meeting or is to meet 
within a period which the court finds does not exceed the 
time reasonably necessary to enable the member to reach the 
committee meeting by the ordinary mode of traveL When 
the Legislature is in session or in recess, extension shall be 
to a date not less than thirty (30) days next following the 
final adjournment of the Legislature or the commencement of 
a recess of more than forty ( 40) days .... " 
[1] The legislative purpose in enacting these two statutes 
lune 19571 BEcKLEY v. REcLAMATION BoARD 
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was well stated in Bottoms v. Superior Cottrt, 82 Cal.App. 
764, 769, 770 [256 P. 422], where it was said in discussing 
section 1054 (of which section 1054.1 was then a part) that 
attorney-legislators "should be relieved by the law from con-
cerning themselves with extraneous matters or interests not 
pertaining to their legislative duties while they are in attend-
ance on sessions of the legislature and actually prosecuting 
their duties as such. On the other hand, the suggestions may 
be ventured, significant in the present connection, that a prac-
ticing lawyer deals with a science involving the most abstruse 
learning, in its remedial and procedural as well as its sub-
stantive branch, and in conserving or preserving, or protecting 
or defending the rights of his clients when such rights are 
questioned in the judicial tribunals, the demand for his 
undivided attention to those causes is as necessary or impera-
tive as is the demand upon him for like attention while 
he is engaged in performing the duties of a member of the 
legislature." The language used by the court in the Bottoms 
case is equally applicable to section 595 which was obviously 
enacted with the same purpose in mind. 
Reviewing the factual situation here, the record shows that 
plaintiffs' attorney, desiring to present an amended pleading 
for the consideration of the court, made an honest and diligent 
effort to notify the court by telegram of his inability to appear 
because of his attendance at a session of the Legislature and 
requested that the entry of judgment be postponed until his 
legislative duties had been concluded and he could devote his 
time to a study of the matter. Through no fault of counsel, 
the telegram was not received by the addressee as a result of 
which the notification and request were not received by the 
trial court and judgments were thereafter entered. Two sub-
sequent telegrams, addressed in the same manner as the first, 
were received by the court but after the judgments had been 
rntered. Believing that his request for a postponement of 
entry of the judgments had been grantrd, plaintiffs' counsel 
did not learn of the entry thereof until the time for appeal 
had expired. Counsel's motion to vacate the judgment was 
denied by the trial court which, apparently, did not believe 
that it had the power to vacate the judgments because it 
stated in its memorandum of decision that ''it [the court l 
would be helpless to set aside the judgments herein.'' 
[2a] 'l'he foregoing statement of facts makes it obvious 
that the trial court did not receive notice of Senator Des-
mond's duties in the Legislature until after the judgments 
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had been entered. Undc:~· the code sed ions ( 
§~ 595, 1054.1) herPtofore set if the (:Ollrt ha(l been 
advised that an attorney of necml 
California I~egislature, Senator Desmond wonl\l have been 
entitled to a eontim1m1ee until his 
eoneluded in order to prepare an amt:lu1rd 
Da.vis v. Stroud, 52 :'.08. 1 
trial court had sustained defendant':-: 
plaint without leave to amend. Pla 
to file an amended or supplemental 
appral it was held an abnsr of dist:retion 
prrmission to file the a<lclitional 
liPid that "'rhe [trial] eonrt Jwd 
prior to judgnwnt to ret'OHsidei' its 
<lrmnrTer without leave to amend t'aL.lnr. 12-1-: 9 CaLlnr 
H1-Yr. Supp. 221)." [3] rrhe established 1 Hlis statf' 
is that amendments to the pleadings may be HUtde at any stage 
of the proceedings in the furtheranc-e of j ustiee v. 
S1lperior Cmtrf. 4:l Ca 1.2cl 860 !27>J P .2d H J , Bank 
A.merica v. Snper·ior Oourl, 20 Cal.2d tiD7, 702 1:28 P .2d 
Carter v. Shinsako, 42 CaL\ pp.2d 9 [ !08 P.2d 
v. Superior Court, 17 CaL2d J 8, 1 :l [ 108 P.2cl 1 :ifJ A.L.R. 
318]; Wade v. 1ffarkwell & Co., 118 C:1L\pp.2d ·110, 416 
P.2d 497, 37 A.L.R2cl 1363J; 21 CnLTu1·. 18:1). Tli the case 
at bar, however, through a lili~ha p, the t t·ial (·om-t clid not 
receive notice of Senator Des monel's req nest for a ennti nmmcc 
because of his senatorial duties. It tlH·JJ hP('<ll1H'S ner•cssm·:v 
to determine whetlH•r or not tlH• trial (·(mrt abnsPd its dis-
eretion in refusing to vaeat<> ilw jnll~nm•uts 1mll<'r S('(~tion 473 
of the Code of Civil Procec1ure. \Ye have t•onelm1ed that t1H~re 
was an abuse of discretion. 
[4] Under section 473, n trial (•omt may ,;\'t a:-:ide its jndg-
ment when the jndgmeut was taken n,;i a '' hrong-h 
his mistake, ina<lwl'tener, snrprisP or l'Xl'llsabk . "1V•-
gardless of whieh of these l~atcgOJ'it's pn•(·Js('l)· (1Pserihes t lw 
rircumstances here involved, an ex:nni nn I ion o l' the· enscs in-
volving section 473 elrarly demonstratPs that relief should 
have been granted. In GreeJW111)JCr v. Uoarrl E. 8. 
Dist., 116 Cal.App. 319 r2 P.2d , t·eli,J 
plaintiff's attorney failed to amend the after a de-
murrer thereto had beell sustained wii lPHtt leave i o amend 
because he relied upon a custom m1tong- aUorueys to one 
another actual notiee before eansing to be entered 
upon a default or a demurrer sustained ·without leave to 
1· HEcr~A:IL\TJO:-.r BoARD 
[48 C.2d 710; 312 P.2d 1098] 
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Schenck, 162 CaL 747, 748 [124 P. 
was vaeated because the defendant, 
cn,;lom mistakenly believed that his demurrer 
failed to ansvver. 'fhe court there said 
doubt that may exist should be resolved in favor 
Ya(:;lte the .iudgmeut], to the end of 
the merits." (See also Nicholls v. 
44:5 [56 P.2d 1289]; W. J. Wallace 
Bank, V~ Cal.App.2d 743, 746 [57 
, 60 Ca1.App.2d 405, 410 [140 
\'. Sliiii!Jhfcr, 22 Cal.2c1 552, 557 [140 P.2d 8), 
11J an action in eqnity, the plaintiff sought to set 
in an action where she, as the defend-
ant, mailed an answer and filing fee which failed to reach 
the elerk of the eomt due to a miscarriage of the mails. vVe 
there hel(\ that th1• default judgment was properly set aside 
on the of extrinsic accident and mistake. We said 
there ''Plaintiff ·was prevented by extrinsic accident and mis-
take of fad from presenting her defense in the municipal 
(•onrt aetion. 'l'hat suC'h aecident and mistake furnish a 
for equitable intervention under the circumstances of 
1his case is dear." (See Winn v. Torr, 27 Cal.App.2cl 623, 
G27 P.2cl ; Wilson Y. Wilson, 55 Cal.App.2d 421, 426 
I J :w P .2d . ) ,J ndgnwnts have also been held properly 
\'at• a ted under sect ioll 47;) lweanse of an attorney's neglect 
dw· to a mistakf• of law (Waite v. Southern Pac. Co., 192 Cal. 
467 1221 P. 204] ; P ickeisen v. Feebler, 77 Cal.App.2cl 148 
117 4 P.2d ss:rj) and the pressure of business (8oda V. Mar-
riott. 1il0 CaLApp. 58~) [20 P.2d 758) ). In Nicol v. Davis, 
DO Cal.App. :n7 [265 P. 867], a judgment of dismissal was 
vacated wlwrc plaintiff's attorney failed to file an amended 
pleading he(·anse he mistakenly believed that a continuanee 
lmd been gra11ted. Tn Carfrr v. Bhinsalw, sttpra, 42 Cal.App. 
2d !J, the trial eonrt Yerbally granted plaintiff permission to 
apply for a modifiC"ation of his order sustaining a demurrer 
wit1wnt leaYe to amend. 'l'hereafter, the court inadvertently 
('aused a judgment of dismissal to be entered. It was held 
1 hat the ;jndgrrH·ni \Y<lS properly vacated under section 478 of 
tlw Code of CiYil Pr·o(·<>dHn·. Tn Riskin v. 'Towers, 24 Cal.2d 
274 [148 P.2d 611, 1:5;3 A.LH. 4421, the defendant failed 
to tmSW'"' because }w hdicved that he had not been legally 
served with stmunmJs. Even though it was judicially deter-
mined that the i'i(~rviee was sufficient, a subsequent denial of 
718 [48 C.2d 
his motion to vacate the default judgment \Vas held to be an 
abuse of discretion. (See also Coyne v. Kn;mpcls, 36 Cal.2d 
257 [223 P.2d 244]; Estate of Strobcck, 111 Oal.App.2d 853 
[245 P.2d 317]; Melde v. Reynolds, 129 Cal. 308 [61 P. 932]; 
Millm· v. Oa1T, 116 Cal. 378 [48 P. 324, 58 Am.St.Rep. 180].) 
In Estate supra, at page it was said, quoting 
from WaybJ"'ight v. Anderson, 200 Cal. 377 [253 P. 148]: 
" 'Section 473 of the Code of Civil Proeedure is a remedial 
provision and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of 
cases upon their substantial merits, and to give to the party 
claiming in good faith to have a snbsistillg cause of aetion or a 
substantial defense thereto an opportunity to present it.' 
And as was said in Burbank v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 2 
Cal.App.2d 664, 667 [38 P.2d 451] : 
'' 'Furthermore, it has been the fixed policy of the law 
always to allow a controversy to be tried and determined on 
its merits (I(alson v. Percival, [217 Cal. 568 (20 P.2d 330)] 
supra) ; and to that end the appellate tribunals are disposed 
to affirm an order to that effect ( W aybdght v. Anderson, 200 
Cal. 374 [253 P. 148] ), and in determining an appeal from 
such an order will resolve any doubts in favor of the appli-
cation for such relief (Waite v. Southern Pac£fic Co., 192 Cal. 
467 [221 P. 204]; Go1·man v. Cal£fornia Tmnsz:t Co., 199 Cal. 
246 [248 P. 923]; Brill v. Fox, 211 Cal. 739 [297 P. 25]). 
Moreover, it is well settled that independent of statutory pro-
visions a trial court has inherent power on its own motion 
to correct mistakes in its proeeedings and within a reasonable 
time to annul its orders and judgments inadvertently made 
(Robson v. Snperior Court, 171 CaL 588 [154 P. 8]; Harris v. 
Minnesota Investment Co., 89 Cal.App. 396 [265 P. 306] ; 
Consolidated Construction Co. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 184 
Cal. 244 [193 P. 238]).' " 
[2b] In view of the clearly expressed legislative policy 
in this state as set forth in section 595 and 1054.1 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the settled policy that where possible 
there shall be a trial on the merits, and the fact that Senator 
Desmond was in no way to blame for the miscarriage or non-
delivery of the \V estern Union telegram advising the court of 
his legislative duties and his request for a continuance, we 
have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to vacate the judgments under section 473 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
Neither party has raised any question on this appeal as to 
the sufficiency of the complaint as amended and this matter 
June 1957] BEcKLEY v. REcLAMATION BoARD 
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has not been briefed. "\Ve have not, therefore, considered this 
question and when this case is reconsidered by the court 
below, it will have the power to determine the sufficiency of 
the complaint as amended or any other pleadings which either 
of the parties may see fit to present. All we are here deciding 
is that the trial court should have granted plaintiff's motion 
to set aside the judgment upon the ground that Senator Des-
mond was entitled to the time requested to give further consid-
eration to the case. 
The order denying plaintiffs' motion for relief is hereby 
reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Traynor, J., eoncurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I concur in the judgment, as I believe that 
relief should have been granted under section 473 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
My disagreement with the majority opinion results from its 
implication that Senator Desmond would have had an absolute 
right to have had the entry of judgment delayed under the 
provisions of sections 595 and 1054.1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure in the event that he had timely shown that he was 
a member of the Legislature, and that he desired such delay 
until after the Legislature had adjourned. It must be re-
membered that the hearing on the demurrer to the first 
amended complaint had been had without objection, and that 
counsel received notice on May 11, 1953, that the demurrer 
had been sustained without leave to amend. Nothing re-
mained to be done but the mere act of entering a judgment 
of dismissal. I find no provision giving counsel the absolute 
right to delay that act. 
Section 595 deals only with the postponement of the "trial 
of any civil action" or the "hearing of any motion, demurrer, 
or other proceeding"; and it provides that when the Legisla-
ture is in session, the ''action or proceeding shall not, without 
the consent of the attorney of record therein, be brought on 
for trial or hearing'' until after a specified time. Section 
1054.1 deals only with the extension of time to do an act 
when "the time allowed therefor" is "provided by law or 
rule of court." Neither section provides for any absolute 
right of counsel to delay the entry of judgment after a hear-
ing has been had without objection on a demurrer and the 
demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend. It 
would appear that the draftsman of these sections intention-
720 CoHEN v. PENN MeT. LIFE I"'s. Co. 
ally omitted any provision for 
ment, as there are many instances 
ters where the entry of a judgment should 
after a cause is submitted following a trial 
without objection. 
On the other hand, it appears 1vithout 
Desmond believed in good faith that he had 
that he attempted to communieat(• his 
to the trial court by telegram. t~]J(ler these (:iremnstn 
C.2cl 
am of the view that relief under section 473 oi the Code of 
Civil Procedure should have been gnmtctL 
1 therefore join in the reversal of the ordP!'S. 
Schauer, J., and McComb, .r., dissentctl. 
[S. F. No. 19647. In Bank. June 21, 1957 
ELIZABETH R. COHEN, Hespondent, v. THE PENN 
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
tion), Appellant. 
[1] Insurance--Avoidance of Policy for Fraud~Life Insurance. 
Where an applicant for insurance is asked whether 
he has had or been treated for any disease or failure 
to mention minor or temporary indispositions is not material 
to the risk and will not avoid the policy; hut the rule is other-
wise when the applicant is asked specific as to his 
medical history, and false answers thereto will vitiate the 
contract. 
[2] !d.-Avoidance of Policy for Fraud-Life Insurance.-l\fis-
representations as to heart symptoms render an insurance 
policy unenforceable. 
[3] !d.-Avoidance of Policy for Fraud-Life Insurance.-Where 
false representations as to material matters in an application 
for insurance have been made, the existence of a fraudulent 
intent to deceive is not essential. 
[4] !d.-Avoidance of Policy for Fraud-Life Insurance.-Under 
Ins. Code, § 334, declaring that "Materiality is to he deter-
mined not by the event, but solely by the probable and reason-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 222; Am.Jur., § 562 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6] Insurance, ~ 130 ; [3, 4) 
Insurance,§ 130; [7-9] Insurance,§ 147(1); [10] Insurance,§ 319. 
